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Abstract
Certain admiralty cargo issues are litigated frequently, often in search of a magical test which
will preclude all further litigation. Three such issues are package limitations, the burden of prov-
ing the condition and quantity of cargo stowed within containers, and the point at which the ocean
carrier delivers cargo at discharge and thus completes its duties under the contract of carriage. De-
spite the frequency with which these issues have been litigated, significant disagreement remains
among the circuit courts as to their proper resolution. This article will examine the current state
of judicial uncertainty in these areas and the indications given by the courts as the positions most
likely to be adopted in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Certain admiralty cargo issues are litigated frequently, often
in search of a magical test which will preclude all further litigation.
Three such issues are package limitations, the burden of proving the
condition and quantity of cargo stowed within containers, and the
point at which the ocean carrier delivers cargo at discharge and
thus completes its duties under the contract of carriage. Despite the
frequency with which these issues have been litigated, significant
disagreement remains among the circuit courts as to their proper
resolution. This Article will examine the current state of judicial
uncertainty in these areas and the indications given by the courts as
to the positions most likely to be adopted in the future.
I. PACKAGE LIMITATION
The United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act' (COGSA)
limits an ocean carrier's liability for cargo loss or damage to $500
per package or customary freight unit unless the shipper has de-
clared the value of the cargo and inserted it in the bill of lading.2
*Partner, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, New York. A.B. 1963, Hobart College;
J.D. 1970, Albany Law School of Union University. This Article is based in part on an
address delivered by Chester D. Hooper to the Torts and Insurance Practice Section of the
American Bar Association on August 10, 1982, at the annual convention in San Francisco.
The text of the address is published at 18 THE FORUM 37 (1982).
-Associate, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, New York. A.B. 1974, New York Uni-
versity; J.D. 1978, Columbia Law School.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976). For a discussion of the statute's legislative history, see
Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 1959 A.M.C. 879 (1959). See
also Encyclopedia Brittannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11-13, 1969
A.M.C. 1741, 1746-47 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976) provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or
damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding
$500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped
in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other
currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the
shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
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This limitation presented little judicial controversy at a time when
packages were small and easily identified as such. The introduction
and widespread use of multi-modal containers for the transporta-
tion of cargo has, however, created much judicial controversy re-
garding the application of the $500 package limitation. 3 The courts
have not been successful in their attempts to settle the question
permanently, but they might be able to diminish the frequency
with which they face the issue by defining the purpose of the
COGSA package limitation. Once that purpose is determined, the
outcome should follow logically and predictably.
A. Containers as COGSA Packages
Part of the difficulty facing the courts stems from the fact that
the drafters of COGSA in 19364 did not envision the large multi-
modal container. The courts have aptly described their attempts to
determine legislative intent on the issue as an exercise in ascertain-
ing "what Congress would have thought about a subject about
which it never thought or could have thought and one about which
we have never thought." 5 Nevertheless, recent case law has ap-
proached a definition of COGSA's purpose, and may have thus
slowed the flow of container package litigation. Judge Friendly's
opinion in Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines6 changed the
Second Circuit law in this area. It brought the Second Circuit
3. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW oF ADMIRALTY 14 (2d ed. 1975); Bissell, The
Operational Realities of Containerization and Their Effect on the "Package" Limitation and
the "On-Deck" Prohibition: Review and Suggestions, 45 TUL. L. REV. 902 (1971); Calamari,
The Container Revolution and the $500 Package Limitation-Conflicting Approaches and
Unrealistic Solutions: A Proposed Alternative, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 687, 688 n.4 (1977);
DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation- The Search for Predictability, 5 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 251 (1974); Simon, Latest Developments in the Law of Shipping Contain-
ers, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 441 (1973). The multi-modal container is a large metal, re-usable
box whose dimensions are up to 40 feet by 8 feet by 8 feet, and which generally carries cargo
valued far in excess of the $500 limitation.
4. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 521, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936).
5. Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1276, 1976 A.M.C. 2178, 2183 (5th
Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted).
6. 636 F.2d 807, 1981 A.M.C. 331 (2d Cir. 1981). The Mitsui panel consisted of an
excellent combination of Second Circuit judges, Chief Judge Feinberg, Judge Friendly and
Judge Oakes, to dispose of the container package issue. Judge Friendly had authored the
landmark opinion of Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 1971 A.M.C.
2383 (2d Cir. 1971) and Judge Oakes had authored the landmark opinion of Royal Type-
writer Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645, 1973 A.M.C. 1784 (2d Cir. 1973).
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approach closer to that of the Ninth Circuit,7 and the Fifth Circuit
has followed suit. 8
Mitsui concerned the loss of containers overboard. The Second
Circuit directed its attention to two containerized cargoes, rolls of
linoleum and piles of tin ingots, and found the COGSA packages
inside the containers in both instances. Most of the discussion cen-
tered on the more interesting issues raised by the piles of tin ingots
which were described in the bills of lading as "bundles." In an
extremely thorough opinion, Judge Friendly reviewed many pre-
vious package decisions and the many criticisms of the Kulmerland
"functional economics" test.9 He stated that one of the purposes of
the COGSA package limitation was to establish an "irreducible
minimum of immunity of the carrier from liability."' 0 For this
purpose, he referred to Lord Diplock's theory that carriers must
have meaningful liability to provide them with a commercial in-
ducement to be cautious."
Although Mitsui expressed reluctance to consider a container a
COGSA package, it was willing to treat a pallet as a COGSA
package. It distinguished containers from pallets and other break-
bulk cargo on the basis that shippers pay freight for the weight of
pallets and other packaging used for break-bulk cargo,12 but do not
7. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, 491 F.2d 960, 1974 A.M.C. 1475 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 873 (1974); see also Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit,
414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (rejecting the parties' intent to regard the container as
the COGSA package and, rather, finding the cartons stowed by the shipper inside the
container to be the COGSA package).
8. Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vuchetich, 664 F.2d 1277, 1982 A.M.C. 1042
(5th Cir. 1982). See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
9. The "functional economics" test creates a presumption for or against the container
being deemed a COGSA package depending on whether the shipper has utilized packaging,
generally its own cartons or crates, sufficient to withstand independently the rigors of break-
bulk carriage. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645, 648-49, 1973
A.M.C. 1784, 1789-90. (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Recent Development, 4 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 409, 413-19 (1980-81) (discussing evolution and criticism of the "functional economics"
test).
10. Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 815, 1981 A.M.C. at 341-42 (discussing the legislative history of
COGSA and the broad purposes underlying the statute as enacted by Congress in 1936,
quoting H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th CONG., 2d Sass. 1 (1936)). See also Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 815, 1971 A.M.C. 2383, 2403 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that the
purpose of § 4(5) of COGSA was to "set a reasonable figure below which the carrier should
not be permitted to limit his liability").
11. Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 815, 1981 A.M.C. at 341. See Diplock, Conventions and
Morals-Limitation Clauses in International Maritime Conventions, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM.
525 (1970). See also DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 276-77.
12. For a definition of break-bulk cargo, see injra note 32.
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pay freight for the weight of containers.' 3 Therefore, Judge
Friendly considered the container, as opposed to a package, a
functional part of the ship.' 4 Judge Friendly also reasoned that
reducing the coverage of a valuable container load of cargo to $500
in effect nullified the COGSA package limitation.' 5 After an ex-
haustive review of these various factors, Judge Friendly concluded:
Clearly the goal of international uniformity is better served
by the approach in Leather's Best that generally a container
supplied by the carrier is not a COGSA package if its contents
and the number of packages or units are disclosed, than by the
functional economics test of Kulmerland. For all these reasons
this panel respectfully declines to follow the functional eco-
nomics test set forth in Kulmerland. 16
Mitsui did not, however, hold that a container would never be
considered a COGSA package. Judge Friendly stated that even a
large container could be considered a COGSA package if the ship-
ping documents gave the carrier no information as to its contents.17
The Mitsui decision also referred to Rosenbruch v. American Ex-
port Isbrandtsen Lines 8 as an example of a clear situation in which
a container should be treated as a package.' In Rosenbruch, a
carrier received a container filled with wholly unpackaged house-
hold goods. Its bill of lading gave the carrier no notice of the
number of units or packages within the container and, in fact, there
probably were no packages within the container.20 Judge Friendly
noted that "[i]n holding that the container was the package under
the circumstances there presented, the [Rosenbruch] court thought
it to be 'of particular importance' that in a column of the bill of
lading prepared by the shipper's agent headed 'No. of Cont. Or
Other Pkgs.' the agent had inserted the figure '1'.21 In others
words, the Mitsui court relied heavily on the intent of the parties in
resolving the container as a package issue.
13. Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 816, 1981 A.M.C. at 343.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 821, 1981 A.M.C. at 351 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 817, 1981 A.M.C. at 344-45.
18. 543 F.2d 967, 1976 A.M.C. 487 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939, 1976 A.M.C.
2684 (1976).
19. Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 817, 1981 A.M.C. at 345.
20. See Rosenbruch, 543 F.2d at 970, 1976 A.M.C. at 490.
21. 636 F.2d at 819 n.15, 1981 A.M.C. at 348-49 n.15 (citation omitted).
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Similarly, the subsequent Second Circuit decision of Smyth-
greyhound v. M/V Eurygenes22 placed great reliance on the intent
of the parties. Eurygenes concerned a shipment of stereo equipment
packaged by the shipper into cartons which were then placed by the
shipper into a carrier-furnished container.2 3 The number of cartons
was disclosed to the carrier in the bill of lading.24 Eurygenes fol-
lowed the Mitsui test and treated the cartons, not the container, as
the COGSA packages. However, Eurygenes indicated that a carrier
could limit its liability to $500 per container if the bill of lading
failed to disclose the number of cartons or units within the con-
tainer, or if the parties indicated, in clear and unambiguous lan-
guage, an agreement to treat the container as the package.2 5
The recent Second Circuit decision of Allied International
American Eagle Trading Corp. v. S/S Yang Ming2 6 further empha-
sizes the parties' intent test 27 by broadening the parties' ability to
limit the carrier's liability to $500 per container. 28 Judge Tenney of
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation, authored Yang Ming. He stated in dicta that contain-
ers could be considered COGSA packages if the bills of lading
clearly defined the containers as packages. 29 Judge Tenney empha-
sized that the Second Circuit did not supplant contract analysis
with notice analysis in resolving the container as a package issue. 30
He further noted that the mere fact that an ocean carrier is notified,
22. 666 F.2d 746, 1982 A.M.C. 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
23. Id. at 747, 1982 A.M.C. at 322.
24. id.
25. See id. at 753, 1982 A.M.C. at 331. There, the court noted: "Mitsui and our decision
today will put carrier interests on notice that the container will not be considered the COGSA
'package' where the bill of lading discloses the contents of the container." Id. The court
proceeded to set forth its alternative test in a footnote, stating:
This does not mean that the parties cannot agree between themselves that the
container will be the COGSA "package," especially in cases where COGSA does not
apply ex proprio vigore. Rather, we hold today that in the absence of clear and
unambiguous language indicating agreement on the definition of "package," then
we will conclusively presume that the container is not the package where the bill of
lading discloses the container's contents.
Id. at n.20, 1982 A.M.C. at 331-32 n.20 (emphasis included).
26. 672 F.2d 1055, 1982 A.M.C. 820 (2d Cir. 1982).
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. 672 F.2d at 1061, 1982 A.M.C. at 828. Although the Second Circuit in Yang Ming
discussed primarily whether pallets were COGSA packages, the court also mentioned con-
tainers extensively in dicta. See id. at 1058-60, 1982 A.M.C. at 823-25.
29. Id. at 1061, 1982 A.M.C. at 829.
30. Id.
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in writing on the bill of lading, of the contents of a pallet or
container, does not supplant the intent of the parties as expressed in
the bill of lading.3'
The courts have not yet dispositively decided what constitutes
an express reference to a container as a package in a bill of lading,
or what language constitutes an unambiguous expression of the
parties' intent to treat the container as a COGSA package. Of
course, no test or formula will be able to determine automatically
the parties' intent. That will have to be decided on a case by case
approach. The parties' intent does, however, seem to be the critical
issue in resolving this commercial dispute. In most instances, deter-
mination of the package issue only assigns part of the loss to the
cargo owner's underwriter or to the carrier's underwriter. If the
parties express their intent clearly and can rely on the courts to
uphold that intent, they can allocate their insurance to protect the
party assigned to bear the risk.
If the parties can predict the outcome of the package issue at
the time of contracting, and insurance is allocated accordingly, the
size or appearance of the package should be irrelevant. An interest-
ing comparison can be made to the alternate limitation unit, the
customary freight unit. The courts have applied it routinely and
more predictably, without regard to the size and nature of a partic-
ular customary freight unit.
B. Customary Freight Limitation
COGSA limits a carrier's liability to $500 per customary
freight unit if the goods are not shipped in packages. If the contents
of a container or bulk-cargo 32 are usually shipped without any
31. Id. The court ruled:
Because of their size and their function in the shipping industry, containers are
ordinarily not considered "packages." But when the bill of lading expressly refers to
the container as one package, or when the parties fail to specify an alternative
measure of the "packages" shipped, the courts have no choice but to respect their
express or implied understanding and to treat the container as a single package. In
such a situation, the carrier's lack of notice of the container's contents indicates that
the parties agreed upon no meaning for "package" other than the container as a
whole. At base, however, the court must examine the parties' contractual arrange-
ment.
In this circuit, Mitsui . . . did not replace contract analysis with notice analy-
sis, and the opinion in Standard Electrica . . . is still the law with regard to pallets.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. "Bulk" cargo, or "break-bulk," generally refers to the method of shipping whereby
individual barrels, boxes, bales, bags, cartons, and drums are stored in the hold of the vessel,
as opposed to being placed in containers. Calamari, supra note 3, at 692 n.24.
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packaging whatsoever, the courts will not automatically treat the
container as a COGSA package simply because the container was
the only possible package. In such a situation, the courts will look to
the "customary freight unit" limitation. 33 If, however, the cargo
within the container is not packaged, but is usually shipped in a
package, the courts will treat the container as a package. 34
In Mitsui, part of the cargo consisted of unpackaged tin ingots
which had been stacked by the shipper inside the container. Al-
though the stacks were described as "bundles" in the bills of lading,
they were not strapped together as use of the word bundle implies. 35
Judge Friendly held that the container was not the package and
that, because the piles were not strapped together, there was no
package. In these circumstances, the customary freight unit limita-
tion would ordinarily apply. 36 However, Judge Friendly construed
a clause of the bill of lading to waive application of the customary
freight unit limitation.3 7 This reasoning would have left the carrier
without any limitation, but the carrier was able to limit liability
because the bill of lading had inaccurately described the ingot piles
as "bundles." The court held that the consignee was estopped from
denying that the piles were bundles (or packages) because its agent,
the shipper, had described them as such. 38
Judge Sofaer of the Southern District of New York followed
this line of reasoning in Watermill Export v. M/V Ponce.3 There,
potatoes were shipped loose in containers. The court held that the
potatoes were not packaged, that potatoes could be shipped in bulk
without packaging, and that the customary freight unit limitation,
not the package limitation, applied. 40 The court's treatment of loose
potatoes shipped within containers as bulk-cargo, rather than as
cargo packaged in containers, was implicitly consistent with Rosen-
33. See Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 822-23, 1981 A.M.C. at 352-54; see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
34. See id. In such a situation, the bill of lading could not possibly refer to any package
other than the container because no other package could exist.
35. Id. at 821-22, 1981 A.M.C. at 352.
36. Id. at 822, 1981 A.M.C. at 352.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 823, 1981 A.M.C. at 354 ("If the action here were by the shipper, this would
seem a classic case for the application of estoppel. Mitsui [the consignee] and its insurer can
stand no better; the shipper must be regarded as their agent in preparing the shipping
documents." (footnote omitted)).
39. 506 F. Supp. 612, 1981 A.M.C. 2457 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
40. Id. at 617, 1981 A.M.C. at 2464.
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bruch.41 Rosenbruch had treated loose household goods within a
container as one package because the household goods required
packaging and the container served that purpose. 42
To date, the general Mitsui and Eurygenes container as pack-
age rules have been followed by the Fifth Circuit cases of Allstate
Insurance v. Inversiones Navieras Imparca43 and Croft & Scully
Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vuchetich. 44 Skulptor Vuchetich added an
interesting element to the container package issue. Freight was
charged per container, and the carrier argued that, if the court did
not consider the container filled with cartons of soft drinks a
COGSA package, the customary freight unit limitation should ap-
ply to the entire container. 45 The customary freight unit would
have limited the carrier's liability to $500 per container. 46 Judge
Brown agreed with this theory and, after reversing the district
court's holding that the container was the package, 47 remanded the
customary freight unit limitation question for factual determina-
tions. He stated that the "customary freight unit" was a question of
fact and would vary from contract to contract. 48 Since the custom-
ary freight unit would be deduced from the contract, the parties'
intent as expressed in the bill of lading and applicable tariffs be-
came important. 4 Judge Brown concluded that, if the container
was actually used as the customary freight unit to compute the
freight charge, the carrier's liability would be limited to $500.50 If,
however, some other customary unit was actually used to compute
the freight charge, and the listing of the container as the freight
41. 543 F.2d at 970, 1976 A.M.C. at 492.
42. Id. The Rosenbruch court had reasoned that the "household goods, absent a con-
tainer, would not have been shipped in separate packages. They would have been shipped in
a large wooden crate or container approximating the size of the metal container that was
actually used." Id.
43. 646 F.2d 169, 1982 A.M.C. 945 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. 664 F.2d 1277, 1982 A.M.C. 1042 (5th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 1281, 1982 A.M.C. at 1047.
46. Id. at 1282, 1982 A.M.C. at 1048. See Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor
Vuchetich, 508 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1981), af'd, 664 F.2d 1277, 1982 A.M.C. 1042 (5th
Cir. 1982).
47. 664 F.2d at 1282, 1982 A.M.C. at 1048.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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unit was a mere sham, the carrier could not limit its liability to
$500.51
Parties to contracts for carriage may find the customary freight
unit a more predictable means than the package unit to express
their intentions concerning limitation. The courts have generally
upheld the customary freight unit limitation without regard to the
unit itself. Perhaps the general notion of a package as a small
cardboard box makes the courts reluctant to hold that it is anything
else. No such notion accompanies the customary freight unit, how-
ever, and the courts seem to have little difficulty holding that the
customary freight unit is whatever the parties determine it to be.
C. Pallets as COGSA Packages
With the same fervency that ocean carriers have attempted to
persuade the courts that containers are COGSA packages, cargo
owners and underwriters have attempted to persuade the courts
that pallets of cargo are not COGSA packages. The Second Circuit
decision in Allied International American Eagle Trading Corp. v.
S/S Yang Ming5 2 indicates that carriers are prevailing in this aspect
of the package argument. In Yang Ming, the Second Circuit held
that a pallet can appropriately be considered a package and that
the courts will generally enforce a bill of lading description of a
pallet as a package. 53 Generally, the courts have allowed parties to
express their intent less clearly when referring to a pallet as a
package, than when referring to a container as a package.
51. Id. In support of this ruling, Judge Brown looked to Caterpillar Ams. Co. v. S.S.
Sea Roads, 231 F. Supp. 647, 1964 A.M.C. 2646 (S.D. Fla. 1964), afj'd, 364 F.2d 829, 1967
A.M.C. 290 (5th Cir. 1966), and quoted the following relevant language from that opinion:
With respect to the words 'customary freight unit,' the authorities are conclu-
sive that this phrase refers to the unit upon which the charge for jreight is computed
and not to the physical shipping unit. As thus construed, the statute gives the court
the task of determining what unit was actually used by the carrier for computing the
freight charge on the shipment in question. Under the statute the freight unit, if one
exists, will control the question of limitation of liability, unless the freight unit
employed was a mere sham, and, therefore, not a 'customary' unit within the
meaning of the statute.
Skulptor Vuchetich, 664 F.2d at 1282, 1982 A.M.C. at 1048 (quoting S.S. Sea Roads, 231 F.
Supp. at 649-50, 1964 A.M.C. at 2648, and citing in accord General Motors Corp. v. S.S.
Mormacoak, 327 F. Supp. 666, 668-69 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 451 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1971) (entire
power plant deemed to be the customary freight unit)).
52. 672 F.2d 1055, 1982 A.M.C. 820 (2d Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 1062, 1982 A.M.C. at 831.
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The Yang Ming cargo consisted of pallets of cases and drums as
well as loose cases and drums. The court referred to the bill of
lading description as follows:
In this case, under the heading "No. of Containers or
P'kgs.," the bill of lading listed eighteen pallets, two cases, and
ten drums, with a total listed as "30 Packages." Under the
heading "Description of Packages and Goods," there is a paren-
thetical listing of the number of cartons, cases and drums on
each pallet, as well as the point of origin and a general legend
reading "Screws, Bolts, Nuts, Studs." Below all of this informa-
tion, a printed line requires the parties to fill in the "Total
Number of Packages or Units (in words)," after which is typed
"Thirty (30) Packages Only. 54
The court held that the pallets as well as the loose cases and
drums were COGSA packages.5 5 Judge Tenney compared the intent
necessary for the court to find that a container is a package with
that required to find that a pallet is a package. He stated that a
clearer expression is necessary for containers because treating con-
tainers as packages can be "ludicrous."5 8 The exhaustive Yang Ming
opinion warrants repeated reading in order to ascertain its various
messages, although its basic holding was stated succinctly: "We
now rule that written notice of the number of containers on a
pallet, even in the bill of lading, is not binding on the carrier if,
elsewhere in the bill of lading, the parties express agreement upon a
number of 'packages' which counts only the pallets.
57
54. Id. at 1056, 1982 A.M.C. at 821.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1062, 1982 A.M.C. at 831.
57. Id. at 1061, 1982 A.M.C. at 829 (footnote omitted). The Yang Ming court specifi-
cally disagreed with the language contained in Allied Int'l Am. Eagle Trading Corp. v. S.S.
"Export Bay," 468 F. Supp. 1233, 1979 A.M.C. 1578 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Export Bay concerned
a cargo identical to the Yang Ming cargo and held that the pallets were not packages. Export
Bay relied on the bill of lading description of both loose drums and cases as well as those
contained in pallets, as packages. Id. at 1234, 1979 A.M.GC. at 1579. The court assumed that
both categories of cargo, pallets and loose cases and drums, could not be considered packages.
Based upon this assumption, the court concluded that the bill of lading description was
ambiguous and construed the ambiguity against the ocean carrier which had drafted the bill
of lading. Thus, the court concluded that the individual cases and drums were the packages,
not the pallets. Id. at 1235, 1979 A.M.C. at 1580-81. The Yang Ming decision disagreed with
Export Bay insofar as the latter case may have relied on the notice to the carrier of the
contents of the pallet. The court noted: "We disagree with [Export Bay], however, at least
insofar as it placed primary importance on mere notice to the carrier in determining the
package limitation." Yang Ming, 672 F.2d at 1061 n.4, 1982 A.M.C. at 829-30 n.4.
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The January, 1982 decision by Judge Mary Johnson Lowe, In
re Universal Enterprises,58 provides a summary of the application of
the above stated theories. The parties had asked Judge Lowe to
find, via a motion for partial summary judgment, COGSA pack-
ages in eight different cargoes. Judge Lowe held that various pack-
aged cargoes, shipped in containers and described as packages in
the bills of lading, were COGSA packages . 9 Furthermore, some
containers were held to be COGSA packages. In those containers,
used computer printout paper was placed into cardboard cartons,
which were then strapped onto pallets. The pallets were then
placed into containers by the shipper. The bill of lading, however,
referred to the containers as the packages. 0 Judge Lowe held that
the shipper was charged with knowledge of the $500 package limi-
tation and concluded that the containers were the COGSA pack-
ages.81 In brief, the courts generally treat the pallet as the historic
package and do not hesitate to limit a carrier's liability to $500 per
pallet.
D. Affording Shippers an Opportunity to Declare a Higher Value
The COGSA package limitation entitles the carrier to limit its
liability for cargo loss or damage "unless the nature and value of
such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and
inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the
bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be conclu-
sive on the carrier. '"62
All recent decisions appear to agree that the carrier cannot rely
upon the package limitation unless he affords the shipper an oppor-
tunity to declare a value higher than the $500 limitation. While
there is agreement on this general principle, there is sharp disagree-
ment as to what constitutes affording shippers an opportunity to
declare a higher value. The Ninth Circuit seems to require a carrier
to invite the shipper to declare a higher value,6 3 while the Fifth
58. No. 76 Civ. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1982).
59. Id. at 25, 34, 39, 42, 47.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Id. at 50.
62. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
63. See Komatsu Ltd. v. States S.S. Co., 674 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1682); Pan Am. World
Airways v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173, 1978 A.M.C. 1834 (9th Cir.
1977). The Ninth Circuit rule approaches a Miranda-type warning by requiring that the
carrier invite the shipper to declare a higher value. Id. at 1177, 1978 A.M.C. at 1838.
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Circuit only requires that the carrier agree to a declaration of a
higher value if the shipper so requests.6 4
The history of the carrier's notice obligation should be exam-
ined briefly to place it in context. Its origins can be found in the
Supreme Court decisions of The Kensington,6 5 Union Pacific Rail-
road v. Burke, 6  and New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
v. Nothnagle.6 7 In essence, these early decisions voided carriers'
limitation of liability provisions when adequate notice of the provi-
sions was not provided.
This concept next appeared, and probably became confused,
in Tessler Brothers Ltd. v. Italpacific Line. 8 There, the court
mixed the Carmack Amendment package limitation with the
COGSA package limitation and stated in dicta that: "A significant
restriction on a carrier's right to limit liability to an amount less
than the actual loss sustained is that the carrier must give the
shipper 'a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower liabil-
ity by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge . . . .-. 9
The Tessler court, however, stated that the bill of lading language
64. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. M/V Peisander, 648 F.2d 415, 425, 1982 A.M.C. 929,
944 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. 183 U.S. 263 (1902). The Kensington posed the question of whether a passenger
carrier could limit its liability to passengers for injury or luggage lost, through language
contained in the tickets, without first notifying the passengers of such waivers. The Supreme
Court ruled that such limitations were void as against public policy. Id. at 268-71.
66. 255 U.S. 317 (1921). Union Pacific involved an agreement between an interstate
railroad company and a shipper which included a condition limiting the shipper's right to
recovery to $100 per package. The Court ruled that the limitation provision found in the bill
of lading was inoperative since the shipper was not given the opportunity to pay a higher
carriage rate in order to avoid the limited recovery clause. Id. at 323.
67. 346 U.S. 128, 1953 A.M.C. 1228 (1953). Nothnagle did not concern ocean transpor-
tation; it concerned a suitcase lost on the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railway. An
unfortunate Mrs. Nothnagle turned her suitcase over to a redcap employed by the railroad,
and never saw the suitcase again. The railroad attempted to limit its liability to $25 per
suitcase according to the provisions of its tariff. The Supreme Court looked to the provisions
of the Carmack Amendment, Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 176, § 1, 38 Stat. 1196, (codified at 94
U.S.C. § 20(11) (1976)), which required a value declared in writing by the shipper, or agreed
upon in writing, before a carrier could limit its liability. The Court held that Mrs. Nothnagle
had "no reasonable opportunity to discover" the limitation and the railroad could not limit its
liability. 346 U.S. at 135-36, 1953 A.M.C. at 1233. See also Gordon H. Mooney, Ltd. v.
Farrell Lines, 616 F.2d 619, 1980 A.M.C. 505 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the Carmack
Amendment package limitation).
68. 494 F.2d 438, 1974 A.M.C. 937 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra note 67.
69. Id. at 443, 1974 A.M.C. at 942 (quoting Nothnagle, 346 U.S. at 135, 1953 A.M.C.
at 1233 and Sommer Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 475 F.2d 292, 298, 1973 A.M.C. 2053,
2060 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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indicated that the carrier's liability would be limited unless the
shipper declared a higher value. 70 The court in effect concluded
that the bill of lading language established evidence of the opportu-
nity.7 ' Thus, the carrier could avail itself of the limitation.
The Ninth Circuit case of Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co.72 did not involve mere ab-
sence of opportunity language in the bill of lading. Rather, it
concerned a statement in the bill of lading which specifically denied
an opportunity to declare a higher value.7 3 The Ninth Circuit disre-
garded the carrier's argument that Pan American World Airways
was a sophisticated shipper and thus must have known that it could
have declared full value despite the disclaimer in the bill of lading.
It interpreted the phrase "in no case" as nullifying the effect of such
knowledge. 4 The court did not, however, indicate what the result
would have been had the carrier proved that the shipper actually
knew that it had the right to declare full value.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar rationale in Komatsu,
Ltd. v. State Steamship Co.75 The court relied on the following
language from the Pan Am decision: "Pan Am requires that the
'opportunity' to declare a higher value must 'present itself on the
face of the bill of lading' to constitute prima facie evidence. ''76
Komatsu included a Clause Paramount 77 in the bill of lading, but
no specific invitation to declare a higher value. The bill of lading
also contained the following clause:
18. Reference is hereby made specifically to value limitations
(46 U.S. Code 1304(5)) and time limitations for filing claim and
bringing suit (46 U.S. Code 1303(6)) which shall apply and are
incorporated herein by reference. 78
70. 494 F.2d at 445, 1974 A.M.C. at 945.
71. Id.
72. 559 F.2d 1173, 1978 A.M.C. 1834 (9th Cir. 1977).
73. The bill of lading language read as follows:
18. AMOUNT OF LIMITATION
The responsibility of the carrier shall in no case, whether governed by the U.S.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the Hague Rules or not, exceed the amount of
$500.00 per package or customary freight unit.
Id. at 1175, 1978 A.M.C. at 1835 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1176, 1978 A.M.C. at 1836.
75. 674 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).
76. Id. at 810 (emphasis added).
77. A Clause Paramount is often included in bills of lading in order to indicate that the
provisions of COGSA should govern the parties' contractual relations.
78. 674 F.2d at 810.
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Even though this clause made reference to COGSA value limita-
tions, it did not specifically invite the shipper to declare a higher
value and was not deemed sufficient evidence that the shipper
received the requisite opportunity.7"
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit allowed the same carrier in-
volved in the Pan Am case, using the same bill of lading, to limit its
liability. In Brown & Root, Inc. v. M/V Peisander, 80 Judge Brown
stated that COGSA was adopted in the bill of lading, and made the
following succinct observation: "With COGSA so expressly
adopted, what does COGSA provide? The answer is simple and
direct: $500 per package unless the nature and value of the goods
have been declared by the shipper and inserted in the bill of lad-
ing. "81 Judge Brown also discussed the Pan Am and Tessler Brothers
cases at length, and concluded that the shipper bore the burden of
proving that it was not afforded the opportunity to declare a higher
value. He explained that Tessler did not assign the burden to the
carrier as the Pan Am and Komatsu decisions had inferred. The
Tessler court had observed:
Tessler contends there is no evidence that the shipper was
offered a choice of rates, one with the limitation and another
without it. The provisions in the bill of lading and COGSA are
prima facie evidence of the opportunity to avoid the limitation,
however, and it is Tessler's burden to prove that such an oppor-
tunity did not in fact exist .... 11
The Fifth Circuit in Peisander thus interpreted Tessler as assigning
the burden of proof to the shipper, and held that the absence of an
invitation in the bill of lading did not shift this burden to the
carrier 83
79. Id.
80. 648 F.2d 415, 1982 A.M.C. 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 420, 1982 A.M.C. at 936 (footnote omitted).
82. Tessler, 494 F.2d at 443, 1974 A.M.C. at 942 (citation omitted). See supra text
accompanying notes 68-71.
83. The court reasoned:
Even accepting the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the "in no case" language of
clause 18, the circumstances of the case before us do not overcome the prima facie
evidence of the opportunity for a choice of rates and valuations nor do they sustain
Shipper's burden "to prove that such an opportunity did not in fact exist ....
First, COGSA was expressly incorporated in the bill of lading to thereby bring into
play § 4(5). . . .Next, and more significantly, the published tariff which has the
effect of law very carefully gave Shipper a choice of valuations by a choice of
precisely definable freight rates. ...
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The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Nathan Trotter & Co.
v. Delta Steamship Lines,84 has agreed with the Fifth Circuit.
Additionally, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in General Electric Co. v. M/V Lady Sophie85 agreed with
the Ninth Circuit, while an older case in the Southern District of
New York, Export Project Services v. S.S. Steinfels,86 sided with the
Fifth Circuit. In Export Project Services, Judge Tyler of the South-
ern District of New York simply referred to the shipper's COGSA
right to declare full value, and held that this right mooted the
"opportunity" argument.8 7
Judge Werker, however, by granting the motion for partial
summary judgment in the Lady Sophie decision,88 precluded the
This gave Shipper the opportunity to choose between valuations by paying
more or less freight. COGSA § 4(5) does not prescribe that the face of the bill of
lading contain a specific space or blank in which the increased valuation is to be
inserted nor does it provide that the carrier rather than the shipper must actually
make the notation. The phrase "unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading" clearly
puts the burden on the Shipper to make the determination as between value
limitations and the making of the declaration. . . . Indeed, the stipulated bill of
lading leaves ample space in the middle of the front page for "Description of
Packages and Goods" under the heading of "Particulars Furnished by Shipper."
Peisander, 648 F.2d at 424, 1982 A.M.C. at 942-43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
84. No. 81 Civ. 3417 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1982).
85. 458 F. Supp. 620, 1979 A.M.C. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 285,
1980 A.M.C. 2399 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. 1975 A.M.C. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
87. Judge Tyler reasoned:
Plaintiffs' second and third contentions, that the shipper must have an option
on freight charges related to limitation of liability and that no option was provided
in this case, are likewise lacking in merit. This court's subject matter jurisdiction
over this case is provided for in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. When
exercising this type of federal question jurisdiction, the federal courts follow federal
common law and look to otherwise applicable state common law only for guidance.
Hence, state law authority cited by plaintiffs (to support the contention that op-
tional freight rates must exist and must be related to limitation of liability) may be
persuasive but is not binding. Even if federal law were as plaintiffs would have it,
the fact that optional rates did exist here would moot the issue. The shipper could
have paid the ad valorem rate; hired another carrier, if the ad valorem rate was
considered too dear; or tried to negotiate another deal with the carrier. If shipper
considered the ad valorem rates exorbitant, it could buy its own insurance for the
cargo.
Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
88. 458 F. Supp. 620, 1979 A.M.C. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Developments in the Lady
Sophie after the decision granting the motion for partial summary judgment are interesting.
After it was held that plaintiff could attempt to recover its total damages of $517,000, the
liability issue was tried and decided in favor of defendant. The court held that the damage
was caused by an error of navigation.
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carrier from relying on the package limitation because it had not
afforded cargo owners an opportunity to declare full value.8 9 The
bill of lading form used not only failed to inform the shipper that it
could declare a higher value, but also failed to mention the package
limitation. The bill of lading only referred to the Hague Rules.90
Judge Werker did not think cargo owners were given a sufficient
opportunity to declare full value because they would have had to
understand the connection between the bill of lading, the Hague
Rules and COGSA in order to discover the package limit and the
right to declare a higher value.9'
The courts generally agree that the shipper must be given an
opportunity to declare a higher value. If the shipper knew it had
the opportunity, then the shipper would be limited unless it had
asked to declare a higher value and the carrier had refused. Litiga-
tion arises when the shipper's knowledge is disputed, and the courts
differ on whether the carrier must inform the shipper or whether
the shipper must independently learn of the COGSA limitation
provisions. The issue can be narrowed to the burden of proving
whether an opportunity was in fact given. The confusion seems to
have started in Tessler, which mixed both COGSA and Carmack
Amendment limitation law. The Ninth Circuit has followed the
Carmack Amendment approach and has, in effect, applied the
Carmack Amendment to ocean carriage when it should have ap-
plied COGSA. The Fifth Circuit has, instead, applied COGSA to
the appropriate cases.
In addition to its sound legal reasoning, the Fifth Circuit has
used a sound practical approach. The Ninth Circuit's approach
wrongly ignores the fact that experienced shippers generally know
of their right to declare higher values. In fact, most cargo interests
use an insurance broker from whom they regularly purchase all-risk
cargo insurance. The cargo insurance will reimburse the cargo
interest for its insured value, regardless of the carrier's ability to
limit its liability.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the opinion below. Because the complaint was dismissed,
the court of appeals did not address the opportunity issue.
89. Id. at 622, 1979 A.M.C. at 727.
90. Id. (citing International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155).
91. Id. The court noted: "These steps are necessitated by the absence of a simple
statement in the bill of lading that the value of the cargo must be declared and inserted
therein to avoid the $500 limitation." Id.
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E. Package Limitations-Summary and Analysis
The container, pallet, and the opportunity to declare a higher
value issues may all be clarified by examining the original purpose
of the COGSA package limitation. Mitsui set forth the two princi-
pal objectives of Congress as: (1) "uniformity in the basic rights and
responsibilities arising out of bills of lading" and (2) "an irreducible
minimum of immunity of the carrier from liability. ' 92 The first
purpose is relevant to the issues of containers and pallets as pack-
ages, while the second purpose is relevant to the issue of opportu-
nity to declare a higher value.
Although Mitsui speaks of uniformity as a purpose, uniformity
can be viewed not as a goal in and of itself, but as a means by which
the goal of predictability can be reached. Two parties to a commer-
cial transaction will be more interested in their ability to predict a
court's interpretation of their bill of lading contract than in assuring
that their bill of lading is similar to other bills of lading. The
similarity of their bill of lading contracts should be of little or no
concern. If the parties wish to treat a container as a package, they
should be able to agree to do so in the bill of lading, confident that
the courts will uphold their intent.
The second purpose, to set an "irreducible minimum" of the
carrier's immunity, is accomplished by the opportunity to declare a
value greater than $500. If a small shipper asks to declare a higher
value and is refused an opportunity to do so by an overreaching
carrier, the carrier will be denied the package or customary freight
unit limitation. Such an event, however, is at best rare and may, in
fact, never occur. Large shippers have traffic departments that
handle bills of lading and are probably in a stronger bargaining
position than ocean carriers. Most smaller shippers use freight for-
warders93 to handle bills of lading and shipping details. The freight
92. Mitsui, 636 F.2d 807, 815 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1936)).
93. The Carmack Amendment defines a "freight forwarder" as:
a person holding itself out to the general public (other than as an express, pipeline,
rail, sleeping car, motor, or water carrier) to provide transportation of property for
compensation and in the ordinary course of its business-
(A) assembles and consolidates, or provides for assembling and consolidating,
shipments and performs or provides for break-bulk and distribution operations of
the shipments;
(B) assumes responsibility for the transportation from the place of receipt to the
place of destination; and
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forwarders are licensed by the Federal Maritime Commission" and
are keenly aware of the $500 package or customary freight unit
limitation.
Finally, the existence of insurance is a significant factor which
must be considered. Shipments are generally insured for all risks
and insurance will reimburse the cargo owner regardless of whether
the carrier can limit its liability. Therefore, if a shipper declares a
higher value and pays a higher freight, it is, in effect, insuring its
cargo twice.
II. JUDICIAL CONFLICTS ON BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Burden of Proof in Cargo Damage Cases
The package issue is not the only one affected by the container
revolution. The issue of allocating the burden of proving the quan-
tity or condition of the containers' contents has also been in sharp
dispute. The courts have usually held that cargo owners and under-
writers bear the burden of proving the condition of cargo hidden
from the carrier's view by packaging, and that the carrier bears the
burden of proving the quantity of cargo received. 5 The courts do
not expect carriers to open packaging in order to check the condi-
tion of the contents, but do expect carriers to count or weigh the
packaging. These same rules have been applied to cargo received by
the carriers in locked and sealed containers. 96 The courts have
reasoned that carriers can weigh containers to verify the quantity
specified in the bill of lading if there is no means of checking the
quantity.9 7
(C) uses for any part of the transportation a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of
the Interstate Commerce Commission ....
49 U.S.C. § 10102(8) (Supp. III 1979).
94. See 46 U.S.C. § 841b(a) (1976) ("No person shall engage in carrying on the business
of forwarding. . . unless such person holds a license issued by the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion to engage in such business. ... ).
95. See Caemint Food, Inc. v. Brasileiro, 647 F.2d 347, 1981 A.M.C. 1801 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 517 F.2d 687, 1975 A.M.C. 2254 (5th Cir.
1975).
96. See, e.g., Tatlow & Pledger (Pty.) Ltd. v. Hermann Forwarding Co., 456 F. Supp.
351 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); E.T. Barwick Mills, Inc. v. Hellenic Lines, 331 F. Supp. 161, 1972
A.M.C. 1802 (S.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd mem., 472 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1973); Samincorp. S.
Am. Minerals & Merchandise Corp. v. S.S. Cornwall, 240 F. Supp. 327, 1964 A.M.C. 2411
(D. Md. 1963).
97. In this light, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(3)(c) (1976) states:
no carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, shall be bound to state or show in the bill
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The courts have held that any affirmative description, such as
a statement of quantity-either in volume or weight-will be bind-
ing on the carrier. 98 If the carrier suspects that the quantity of the
cargo is not as described by the bill of lading, it should not issue the
bill of lading with that quantity description. If the carrier has no
means of checking the quantity description and it issues the bill of
lading, including the description, it may be estopped from later
denying the description."'
The description of condition has been treated differently by
the courts. If the carrier simply issues a clean bill of lading without
any exception for damaged cargo, and has no reasonable means of
checking the condition of the cargo, the carrier will not be estopped
from impeaching the clean bill of lading. The courts have, of
course, considered the clean bill of lading applicable only to receipt
for the condition of the external packaging. The carrier cannot state
that the contents are damaged unless it knows the internal condi-
tion. 100 When receipting for quantity, the carrier can state that it
has no knowledge of what is actually inside cardboard cartons said
to contain certain items, but it cannot state that it does not know
how many cartons are actually inside the containers. 101 To avoid
liability for the quantity, the carrier must refuse to issue a bill of
lading that includes a representation that a certain number of
cartons are inside a locked and sealed container.
The Ninth Circuit in Portland Fish Co. v. States Steamship
Co. 10 2 reversed a trial court which had allowed a carrier to impeach
a bill of lading that described the weight of a cargo of fish. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that if the carrier had no reasonable means
of checking the weight of the cargo, it should not have issued the
bill of lading with the weight description. 0 3 Once the weight was
described, purchasers of the bill of lading would rely on that
of lading any marks, number, quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground
for suspecting not accurately to represent the goods actually received, or which he
has had no reasonable means of checking.
Id.
98. Spanish-American Skin Co. v. M.S. Ferngulf, 143 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), af'd, 242 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1957).
99. Id. at 350.
100. S.M. Sartori, Inc. v. S.S. Kastav, 412 F. Supp. 1181, 1977 A.M.C. 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
101. See infra note 108.
102. 510 F.2d 628, 1975 A.M.C. 395 (9th Cir. 1974).
103. Id. at 630-31, 1975 A.M.C. at 396-97.
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weight. To preserve the instrument's negotiability, the Ninth Cir-
cuit estopped the carrier from denying that it had received the
goods described in the bill of lading. 10 4 After this decision was
issued, several ocean carriers moved for rehearing and the opportu-
nity to file amicus curiae briefs. The carriers were apparently con-
cerned about the possible effects of the decision on containerized
cargoes. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing because it did not
intend the decision to apply to containers.10 5
The courts were quick to address the issues left open in Port-
land Fish. In both Baby Togs, Inc. v. S.S. American Ming, 0 6 and
Westway Coffee Corp. v. M. V. Netuno,10 7 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York reasoned that the carrier did not
have to include a description of the weight or volume of the cargo
in the bill of lading, and questioned whether the carrier should be
estopped from denying such a description. Baby Togs may not have
gone as far as the Westway decision appeared to go. The court in
Baby Togs gave the bill of lading quantity description prima facie
weight and held that the carrier had failed to rebut it. 108 Because
104. Id. at 631-33, 1975 A.M.C. at 399-401.
105. Id. at 634, 1975 A.M.C. at 2373-74.
On rehearing, several ocean carriers have moved for leave to file briefs amicus
curiae. However, it appears that the issues sought to be raised in such briefs concern
the possible effect of our decision on the ocean transportation of containerized
cargoes-those in sealed "packages" not normally opened and inspected by the
carrier at the time he issues a bill of lading. The motions are denied. Since the case
before us involves solely a bulk shipment subject to piece count, the questions thus
raised will have to wait another day for decision. We intimate no opinion on them.
Id.
106. 1975 A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
107. 528 F. Supp. 113, 1982 A.M.C. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1982).
108. 1975 A.M.C. at 2018-19. The court reasoned:
Defendant carrier contends that plaintiff has failed to prove the contents of the
container and their condition at the time of delivery to defendant. In so doing, it
relies upon the statements "Shipper's Load & Count" and "Said to Contain" appear-
ing on the dock receipt and on the clean bills of lading which defendant issued.
However, the bills of lading herein also list the number of cartons of infants' wear,
their cubic measurement, and their weight, although under 46 U.S. Code, sec.
1303(3)(c), the carrier may omit such information from the bill of lading if it has
reasonable grounds for suspecting, or no reasonable means of checking, the accu-
racy of any marks, number, quantity or weight. . . . Accordingly, the recitation of
the number, weight and measurement in the bills of lading established prima facie
receipt by the carrier of the number, weight and measurement recited, regardless of
the above quoted statements appearing on those documents.
This prima facie proof has not been effectively rebutted by competent evi-
dence.
Id. at 2018 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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the carrier failed to rebut the prima facie case, the court noted that
it did not have to address the estoppel theory.' 09
The district court in Westway seemingly went one step fur-
ther. The court estopped a carrier from impeaching the bill of
lading description of the number of cartons of instant coffee stowed
within a container."10 However, the carrier in that situation had the
opportunity to check the contents by weighing the container and
did not do so. In his opinion, Judge Sand commented:
"[COGSA] specifically provides a method for avoiding carrier
liability for false information ... by not stating it in the
bill .... The carrier must utilize that method, rather than the
quite general reservation attempted here." ... Since plaintiff
relied on the weights specified in the bills in purchasing the
consignment, defendant is estopped from denying the accuracy
of the description contained therein.'
109. Id. at 2020 n.9. "In light of the foregoing, it is not necessary to find that, where
defendant's clean bill of lading is relied upon in purchasing and paying for the merchandise
covered, it is estopped from adducing evidence to prove that the shortage was of preshipment
origin." Id. (citation omitted).
110. In summarizing the parties' arguments, the court explained:
Plaintiff contends that the weights stated in the June 7, 1979 bill of lading
constitute "prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein
described," 46 U.S.C. § 1303(4); ...that it was entitled to rely on the weights
stated in the bill of lading which was duly negotiated to it; and that [carrier] ...is
estopped from claiming that the missing cartons of coffee were not in the containers
when [carrier] ...took possession of them.
Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to prove delivery of the full
quantity to the carrier, and thereby has failed to establish a prima facie case; and
alternatively, that defendant has established that it exercised proper care; and that
plaintiff's estoppel theory does not apply to cases involving sealed containers.
528 F. Supp. at 116, 1982 A.M.C. at 508 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted). In upholding
plaintiffs estoppel theory, the Westway court continued:
Defendant inexplicably bases this last contention on Portland Fish Co. v. States
Steamship Co., 510 F.2d 628, 634, 1975 A.M.C. 2373 [DRO] (9th Cir. 1974), in
which the court denied a rehearing and stated that it "intimated no opinion" with
respect to the impact of its decision on containerized cargoes which may not be
opened and inspected by the carrier when the bill of lading is issued. Id. In any
event, defendant's inability to open the containers and inspect their contents is
irrelevant to this case, because this case involves the presence of the missing cargo,
not its condition, and because defendant had the alternative of weighing the con-
tainers to verify that they contained the consigned cargo.
Id. at 116 n.5, 1982 A.M.C. at 508 n.5 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 116-17, 1982 A.M.C. at 509 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Spanish Am. Skin
Co. v. The Ferngulf, 242 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1957)).
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Judge Sand then noted that if the carrier had weighed the
containers when it received them, the carrier would not have been
estopped from denying the bill of lading quantity. 112 In that event,
the carrier would have demonstrated delivery of everything it had
received. The court also noted that, even though the carrier was
estopped from denying the contents, such estoppel would not neces-
sarily preclude it from escaping liability. " 3 If the carrier had
proven itself free of the negligence which might have allowed the
theft, it would not have been liable. The Second Circuit affirma-
tion did not rely on the estoppel issue.
These cases should be compared to the non-containerized
cargo case of Caemint Food, Inc. v. Lloyd Brasileiro Companhia
de Navegavao." 114 That case concerned a shipment of canned
corned beef packed in cardboard cartons and shipped break-bulk.
In holding the carrier liable, Judge Motley of the Southern District
of New York held that mold damage had started before the cartons
were delivered to the vessel and that improper ventilation of the
vessel's holds had aggravated the damage. 1 5
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, reversed the
district court's decision and held that the shipper had the burden of
proving good order and condition of the contents of the cardboard
cartons when they were delivered to the carrier."' Because the
carrier had no reasonable means of checking the inside of the
cardboard cartons, the carrier was not estopped from denying the
good order and condition of the cargo at the time the carrier
received the cargo." 7 Judge Friendly noted that the cargo owners
and underwriters had failed to prove that the cargo was free from
damage at delivery to the carrier, and that the district court had
specifically held that some damage existed at the time of delivery to
the carrier. 118 The court followed The Niel Maersk,"9 and assigned
to cargo claimants the burden of separating the damage caused by
112. 528 F. Supp. at 116, 1982 A.M.C. at 508.
113. Id. at 116-17, 1982 A.M.C. at 509.
114. 501 F. Supp. 791, 1981 A.M.C. 1815 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 647 F.2d 347, 1981
A.M.C. 1801 (2d Cir. 1981).
115. 501 F. Supp. at 794, 1981 A.M.C. at 1818.
116. 647 F.2d at 351-52, 1981 A.M.C. at 1807.
117. Id. at 352, 1981 A.M.C. at 1807-08.
118. Id. at 354-55, 1981 A.M.C. at 1809.
119. 91 F.2d 932, 1937 A.M.C. 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 753, 1937 A.M.C.
1646 (1937).
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the pre-shipment condition from the aggravation of that damage
due to the improperly ventilated holds. Since cargo claimants had
failed to satisfy this burden, the carrier prevailed.
In this thorough opinion, Judge Friendly described the bur-
dens of proof. He explained that the shipper presents a prima facie
case by proving delivery to the carrier in good order and condition
and receipt from the carrier in damaged or short condition.
120
Judge Friendly explained further that the plaintiff would have
prevailed had the carrier not controverted the clean bill of lading as
evidence of good condition at delivery to the carrier.' The carrier
had successfully controverted the bill of lading evidence by showing
high humidity and damp conditions in the pre-loading storage
area. 1 22 The court inferred from this evidence that mold had started
to form on the labels of the corned beef cans before the cans were
loaded on board the vessel. Judge Friendly concluded that plaintiff
had produced no evidence that the presence of the mold on the
cans, when they were delivered to the carrier, would have caused a
change in the external appearance of the cartons and thus made the
damage protest to the carrier.123 The court stated that if the exter-
nal appearance of the cartons had disclosed to the carrier the
internal damage, the carrier should have so noted in the bills of
lading. Had the carrier not included such a clause in the bills of
lading, it would have been estopped from denying the defective
loading condition. 12
4
These decisions, holding a carrier liable for the quantity of
cargo in a sealed container despite the bill of lading clause "shippers
load and count," can cause harsh results. The courts presume that
120. 647 F.2d at 352, 1981 A.M.C. at 1807.
121. In Caemint Food, 647 F.2d at 352, 1981 A.M.C. at 1807-08, the court reasoned:
A clean bill of lading is ordinarily prima facie evidence of delivery in good
condition. . . . If plaintiff here were suing for damage to the cartons, the recitals of
apparent good order and condition in the bills of lading issued by defendant would
constitute prima facie evidence that the cartons were delivered in good condition. If
defendant introduced no evidence to controvert the bills of lading, plaintiff would
have carried its burden of proving delivery in good condition and, since damage to
the cartons at outturn is conceded, would have established a prima facie case for
recovery.
Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 354-55, 1981 A.M.C. at 1812.
123. Id. at 353, 1981 A.M.C. at 1810.
124. See also Arista Indus. v. S.S. Export Agent, 1978 A.M.C. 2128 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
where Judge Weinfeld found the ocean carrier not to be estopped from contesting the
condition of cargo within cartons despite its issuance of a clean bill of lading. Id. at 2129.
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the amount of cargo in packages or containers can be checked by
counting or weighing. If the carrier has no reasonable means of
checking the quantity, and it allows the quantity description to
remain on the bill of lading, it does so at its peril. 25 The carrier
may derive a sense of security by inserting a clause in the bill of
lading stating "shipper's load and count," or "said to contain," but
the courts have paid little attention to these clauses.12 6 If carriers
abided by the procedure suggested by the courts and deleted quan-
tity descriptions from bills of lading, the carriers' financial interests
would be adversely affected. Shippers would not be able to negoti-
ate the bills of lading through banks and obtain payment of their
letters of credit. In addition, if carriers insisted on opening sealed
containers to count cargo, shippers would object because the cargo
would be delayed and possibly damaged or pilfered.
It is anomalous that a carrier can issue a clean bill of lading
which acts as a receipt only for the external good order and condi-
tion of the container, regardless of the cargo's condition, but cannot
issue a similar receipt for the quantity of the cargo in the same
container.
B. Burden of Proof in Fire Damage Cases
Judicial disagreements as to the allocation of the burden of
proof and the consequences arising therefrom are most clearly re-
flected in the Ninth and Second Circuit decisions concerning the
burden of proof assignments in fire cases. 127 The Ninth Circuit, in
125. Problems may arise if the carrier has no reasonable means of checking the contents.
See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. If the carrier checks the contents, it should
also, if necessary, change the quantity description.
126. See supra note 108.
127. The liability of carriers for damage to or loss of cargo arising out of fire on board
the vessel is governed generally by the Fire Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1976), and the COGSA
Fire Defense, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1976). The Fire Statute provides that:
No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any person any
loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever, which shall be
shipped, taken in, or put on board any such vessel, by reason or by means of any fire
happening to or on board the vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or
neglect of such owner.
46 U.S.C. § 182.
The COGSA Fire Defense states that:
(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from . . .
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier . . ..
46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b).
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Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines,12 8 required a
shipowner to bear the burden of proving the exercise of due dili-
gence in making a vessel seaworthy as a condition precedent to
relying on the COGSA fire defense or on the fire statute.129 The
Second Circuit, in In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp.,'130
specifically and almost vehemently disagreed with Sunkist, holding
that the vessel owner does not bear this burden.13 1 According to the
Second Circuit, the vessel owner need only prove that the damage
in question was caused by fire. 132 The shipper then bears the burden
of proving that the fire damage was caused by the fault or was
within the privity of the vessel owner.1
33
Both Sunkist and Ta Chi referred to Asbestos Corp. v. Com-
pagnie de Navigation, the Second Circuit opinion authored by
Judge Timbers. 134 That case held that the vessel owner had not
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy due to its
deficient fire-fighting equipment and excluded the shipowner from
the benefits of the COGSA fire defense and the fire statute. 13
In Sunkist, the Northern District of California held that the
shipper failed to carry its burden of proving that the fire was the
result of the design, neglect or fault, or was within the privity of,
the owner or of the charterer of the ship, and exonerated the
carrier. 136 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, and stated
that the district court had misread Asbestos. The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Asbestos case held the vessel liable for the "inexcus-
128. 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C. 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012,
1980 A.M.C. 2102 (1980).
129. Id. at 1336, 1979 A.M.C. at 2798-99.
130. 677 F.2d 225, 1982 A.M.C. 1710 (2d Cir. 1982).
131. Id. at 229, 1982 A.M.C. at 1715.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 480 F.2d 669, 1973 A.M.C. 1683 (2d Cir. 1973).
135. Id. at 672, 1973 A.M.C. at 1687. In dicta, the court stated the following regarding
the burden of proof scheme:
Generally . . .[t]he burden of proof is on the carrier to show that he exercised
due diligence. The fire xemption provisions merely shift this burden of proof to the
shipper. If the carrier shows that the damage was caused by fire, the shipper must
prove that the carrier's negligence caused the damage.
Id. at 672-73, 1973 A.M.C. at 1687 (footnote omitted).
136. 1976 A.M.C. 2597, 2604-05 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C.
2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012, 1980 A.M.C. 2102 (1980).
1982]
26 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:1
able condition of unseaworthiness"' 137 and that the Second Circuit's
comments concerning the burden of proof were dicta.13
The Second Circuit in Ta Chi responded to the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of Asbestos with the following comment:
We disagree not only with Sunkist's unflattering characteri-
zation of Judge Timbers' opinion in Asbestos, an opinion that
was concurred in by Judges Smith and Hayes, but also with the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the interrelation between the
fire statute and COGSA, an interpretation that is concurred in
by no other Circuit. 139
Ta Chi concerned fire which began when acetylene gas es-
caped from a welding hose in the ship's engine room. The district
court followed the Sunkist rule140 and required the vessel owner to
prove an exercise of due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy at
or before the commencement of the voyage.14 1 It stated that, if the
shipowner failed in this task, any loss which occurred by reason of
fault or neglect in this area was within the shipowner's privity, and
it could not avail itself of the fire exemption statutes. 42 The Second
137. 603 F.2d at 1335, 1979 A.M.C. at 2798.
138. In its discussion of the district court's misinterpretation of the Asbestos opinion, the
Ninth Circuit made the following comments:
True enough, the Second Circuit in speaking to both the Fire Statute and
COGSA made the statement: "The burden of proof is on the carrier to show that he
exercised due diligence. The fire exemption provisions merely shift this burden of
proof to the shipper. If the carrier shows that the damage was caused by fire, the
shipper must prove that the carrier's negligence caused the damage.". . . The use of
this language was entirely unnecessary to the decision for the reason that the court
had already affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Marquette was unsea-
worthy because of her owners' failure to exercise due diligence.
Our overlengthy analysis of the language in Abestos Corp. is prompted by the
casual treatment of the burden of proof by the author of the appellate court opinion.
Although relying on COGSA, he completely overlooks the language of §§ 1303(1)
and 1304(1) which places the burden of showing due diligence to provide a seawor-
thy ship squarely on the shoulders of the carrier. It is this burden that appellees must
overcome in order to invoke the exemptions of either § 1304(2)(b) or the Fire
Statute.
Id. at 1335-36, 1979 A.M.C. at 2798-99 (citations omitted).
139. In re Ta Chi Nav., 677 F.2d at 229, 1982 A.M.C. at 1715.
140. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
141. 504 F. Supp. 209, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
142. Id. at 230.
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Circuit reversed and specifically held that cargo claimants had the
burden of proving fault and privity of the vessel owner. 43
The Second Circuit then cited various authorities for its hold-
ing. 44 It noted that when Congress intended to place the burden of
proof on the shipowner, the statute was specific. 145 To the extent
Congress did not specifically place the burden of proof on the
shipowner, it placed the burden on the cargo owners.
The Ninth Circuit seems to overlook the original intent Con-
gress expressed when it enacted COGSA. If Congress had intended
to make proof of the exercise of due diligence to make a vessel
seaworthy a condition precedent to the fire defense, it would have
expressed such an intent. To make proof of due diligence a condi-
tion precedent is to interpret COGSA without looking to the origins
of COGSA and the fire statute. Similar interpretations of the Har-
ter Act's delivery requirements 14 have led some courts to base their
decisions not on the original purpose of the requirements, but on
143. 677 F.2d at 228-29, 1982 A.M.C. at 1714-15. The Second Circuit reasoned:
The district court's approach to the burden of proof is not as straightforward as
we have presented it. It is clear, however, that the entire approach reflects a
misunderstanding of the terms of the Fire Statute as they have been applied by the
Supreme Court and the courts of this Circuit. The Fire Statute ... exonerates the
shipowner from liability for fire damage to cargo unless the fire was caused by the
"design or neglect" of the owner. "Neglect", as thus used, means negligence, not the
breach of a non-delegable duty .... If the carrier shows that the damage was
caused by fire, the shipper must prove that the carrier's negligence caused the
damage."
Id. at 228, 1982 A.M.C. at 1713 (citations omitted) (quoting Asbestos, 480 F.2d at 673).
144. 677 F.2d at 228, 1982 A.M.C. at 1713. See, e.g., J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine
Howaldt, 437 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir. 1971); Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d
426, 432 (2d Cir. 1962); Automobile Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 224 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 885 (1955); American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194
F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952).
145. 677 F.2d at 229, 1982 A.M.C. at 1715-16. The court noted:
When Congress wanted to put the burden of proving freedom from fault on a
shipowner claiming the benefit of an exemption, it specifically said so. The Sunkist
court would read the language of subsection (q) into subsection (b), "although
Congress did not put it there.".... This Court has not put it there either. We
adhere to our prior holdings that, if the carrier shows that the damage was caused
by fire, the shipper must prove that the carrier's negligence caused the fire or
prevented its extinguishment.
Id. (citations omitted). Ta Chi was remanded and is being retried. It is not possible at this
time to determine whether either party will file a petition for certiorari. If a petition is filed,
it will be interesting to learn whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to settle the
dispute between the circuits.
146. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-191 (1976).
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regulations of some port authorities which were probably drafted to
defeat the Harter Act's delivery requirements.
III. DELIVERY DISPUTES IN SHIPMENTS TO THIRD
WORLD NATIONS
The Harter Act requires carriers to deliver cargo properly.1 47
Once the carrier properly delivers cargo, its contract of carriage is
complete, and it is no longer liable for any damage to that cargo.
The courts have defined delivery as delivery to a fit and proper
wharf with the consignee being given a reasonable opportunity to
pick up the cargo. Alternatively, the carrier can properly deliver
the cargo by delivering according to the custom and regulations of
the port.
Many port authorities, particularly in Third World countries,
have attempted to avoid liability for cargo loss and damage by
defining "delivery" from the vessel as occurring long after physical
custody and control of the cargo has passed to the local port author-
ity. Judge Weinfeld may have rendered such attempts ineffective in
the Second Circuit by his decision in Farrell Lines v. Highlands
Insurance Co. 148 There, the vessel carried shoes from New York to
Monrovia, Liberia. The vessel arrived in Monrovia on March 28,
1980. The cargo was unloaded from the ship to the stringpiece by
stevedores employed by the carrier between March 28 and March
30, 1980. Thereafter, the cargo was handled by stevedores em-
ployed by the National Port Authority. Approximately $5,000
worth of cargo was missing when transferred from the stevedores
employed by the carrier to those employed by the Port Authority.
The cargo was placed into the Port Authority warehouse, and a
warehouse receipt was issued on May 6, 1980. By then, cargo worth
approximately $60,000 was missing. The Liberian Port Regulations
defined delivery as follows: "Cargo shall only be regarded as landed
when placed and safely deposited in the Transit Warehouse or at a
place designated by the Port Manager, and until then delivery of
the cargo shall not be considered to have been made to the Author-
ity. '149
147. Id. § 190.
148. 532 F. Supp. 77, 1982 A.M.C. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
149. Id. at 79, 1982 A.M.C. at 1432.
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Judge Weinfeld held that delivery occurred when the physical
transfer occurred on the stringpiece. 50 He did not decide the case
based on Liberian law, but applied the United States Harter Act
and the case law which has interpreted that act. Judge Weinfeld
explained that, as a general rule, American law requires delivery of
the cargo to the consignee at a fit and proper wharf, with reason-
able notice to the consignee that the cargo has arrived, and a
reasonable opportunity for the consignee to take possession of the
cargo. 151 Judge Weinfeld then explained the exceptions which gov-
erned Farrell Lines:
[T]his general rule of proper delivery is subject to a well-recog-
nized exception where custom, regulation or law of the port
otherwise provide. As stated by the Supreme Court,
"No rule is better settled than that delivery must be accord-
ing to the custom and usage of the port, and such delivery
will discharge the carrier of his responsibility."'' 52
Judge Weinfeld interpreted this rule to mean that delivery
occurred when the cargo was physically transferred. 153 If the trans-
fer was in accordance with the port regulations or customs, it was
proper. The cargo owner argued that delivery did not occur simul-
taneously with the physical transfer, but occurred when the port
regulations so provided. 154 Judge Weinfeld suggested that the appli-
cation of the Liberian Port Regulations 155 would "emasculate the
well-established rule . . . that where delivery is compelled accord-
ing to custom and usage of the port, the carrier is discharged of its
responsibility."116
The holding in Farrell Lines differed from those in Black Sea
& Baltic v. S. S. Hellenic Destiny'57 and Early California Industries
v. M/V Hellenic Pioneer. 58 In Black Sea, defendant made a motion
150. Id. at 80, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433.
151. Id. at 79, 1982 A.M.C. at 1432. See also F.J. Walker Ltd. v. M/V Lemoncore, 561
F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir. 1977); Calcot, Ltd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 318 F.2d 669, 673 (1st Cir.
1963); Tan Hi v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 432, 434-35 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
152. 532 F. Supp at 79, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433 (footnote omitted) (quoting Constable v.
National S.S. Co., 154 U.S. 51, 63 (1894)).
153. 532 F. Supp. at 80, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 79, 1982 A.M.C. at 1432 (citing Port Regulations of the National Port
Authority, Liberia (1974)).
156. Id. at 79-80, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433.
157. 500 F. Supp. 677, 1981 A.M.C. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
158. No. 75 Civ. 2255 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982).
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for partial summary judgment to decide whether the shipper had
proved a prima facie case by introducing a clean bill of lading and
certificates issued by the Saudi Arabian customs officers. 15  The
certificates reported a shortage of cargo at the customs authority's
warehouse. The relevant Saudi Arabian port regulation read as
follows:
Actual receipt of the goods by Customs takes place only when
the goods arrive at the gates of [Customs] warehouses or at the
places assigned for storage, and when a careful inspection of the
external condition of the package has been made. Consequently,
goods that have been unloaded remain under the control and
responsibility of the shipping companies until they are actually
received by the Customs warehouseman.160
Although Black Sea can be distinguished from Farrell Lines
because the regulations in Black Sea specified that cargo remain
under the control and responsibility of the carrier until received by
the customs warehousemen, the two cases seem to conflict. The
Black Sea decision spoke of two deliveries, a physical delivery and a
legal delivery, 161 while the Farrell Lines decision concentrated
solely on the physical delivery of the goods. 16 2
159. 500 F. Supp at 677, 1981 A.M.C. at 926. See supra notes 95-126 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the burden of proof scheme in this area.
160. Black Sea, 500 F. Supp. at 678, 1981 A.M.C. at 927 (quoting Saudi Arabian
Customs Regulations and Rules for Implementation, Article 124).
161. In Black Sea, the court summarized:
[W]e find that proper delivery according to the law governing Saudi Arabian
ports occurs when a "careful inspection of the external condition of the packages" is
made. That inspection includes both an inventory of the total delivery and a
segregation and weighing of the damaged cargo. The Certificate of Imported Goods
reflects this inspection.
It is unnecessary, for the purpose of disposing of this motion, to determine
when this inspection actually takes place. While a reading of the applicable regula-
tions leaves the impression that the segregation and weighing of damaged cargo and
the inventory of all the cargo occur simultaneously and soon after physical delivery,
the evidence of both parties in this case indicates that the inventory, at least, is not
generally conducted until clearance procedures begin. To be sure, when such delay
occurs it renders Article 131 meaningless, for the goods would be cleared out of
Customs just as they are officially received in Customs. Nevertheless, the determina-
tion of the factual question of when the inspection actually occurs cannot change the
fact that it is this inspection which ends the carrier's liability and which is reflected
in the Certificates.
Id. at 681 (footnote omitted).
162. In Farrell Lines, Judge Weinfeld stated: "[Defendant's] argument that the regula-
tion governs the determination of when delivery occurred disregards the actual fact that
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The more recent case, Early California Industries,"3 involved
the same parties as Black Sea and simply followed that opinion.
Thus, the Black Sea court's apparent reliance on Saudi Arabian law
to define proper delivery was directly counter to the reasoning
applied by the Southern District in Farrell Lines. In Farrell Lines,
Judge Weinfeld specifically held that the law of the United States,
and not the law of Liberia, applied.16 4 This approach has been
followed subsequently by several courts. 16 5
All the above decisions in the delivery area leave substantial
room for argument, both from cargo and shipowning interests.
Once the courts agree that delivery occurs simultaneously with
physical transfer, only the propriety of the physical transfer need be
litigated. The tests which now exist will allow the parties to a bill of
lading to predict accurately when and how the delivery will be
accomplished and, thus, the point at which their contract will be
completed. Only factual disputes concerning delivery should be left
to be litigated.
CONCLUSION
Litigation in the areas of package limitation, burden of proof
and delivery can probably never be eliminated by any judicially
Farrell . . .lost physical custody and control of the cargo upon its delivery to the stringpiece
and that, thereupon, it was received by [the National Port Authority] for delivery to the
consignee." 532 F. Supp. at 80, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433.
163. No. 75 Civ. 2255 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982).
164. 532 F. Supp. at 79-80, 1982 A.M.C. at 1433. It should be noted that the Farrell
Lines decision is on appeal and oral argument was heard by the Second Circuit (Judge Oakes,
Judge Winter and Southern District Judge Metzner) on October 20, 1982. Moreover, Black
Sea will be appealed shortly. The opinions rendered in these two cases should put the issue to
rest in the Second Circuit.
165. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Imparca Lines, 646 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981); All
Commodities Supplies, Ltd. v. M/V Acritas, 1982 A.M.C. 166 (E.D. La. 1981). In Acritas,
the stevedores operated the vessel's winches and gears in Apapos/Lagos, Nigeria and dis-
charged the cargo directly into trucks alongside the vessel. The court noted that:
Because the stevedores were appointed and paid by an agency of the Nigerian
Government, the vessel interests had no control over the stevedores or over discharge
of the cargo. Once the stevedore personnel commenced handling the bags of rice in
the vessel's holds, the cargo was surrendered into the exclusive custody and control
of the NPA and its appointees, and was beyond the custody and control of the vessel
interests.
Id. at 168.
The court explained that the vessel was required by the Nigerian regulations to surrender
control of the cargo to the stevedores who discharged the vessel. Therefore, a proper delivery
occurred at that time. Id. at 170.
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created rule or legislative change of law. Litigation problems in
these areas may be solved, however, by the contracting parties'
ability to predict the judicial interpretation of their contract, and to
place insurance to cover the predictable risks.
The package limitation will be predictable if the courts abide
by the parties' intent as expressed in the bill of lading. The ocean
carrier should not have to prove that it advised the shipper of its
rights to declare a higher value; the shipper should bear the burden
of proving that the carrier would not agree to the higher declara-
tion.
Likewise, the parties to a bill of lading should be able to
prepare bills of lading in a manner which indicates an absence of
knowledge of the quantity as well as the condition of a container's
contents. The practicalities of the ocean shipping industry do not
allow the carrier time to open and count the contents of every
container. Nor do the practicalities of the shipping industry permit
a shipper to transfer a bill of lading without a representation of the
quantity of cargo within a container even if the bill of lading has a
clause indicating the carrier's lack of knowledge of the contents. In
this era of sophisticated, worldwide transportation, a consignee
almost certainly relies upon the shipper, not the ocean carrier, for
shipment of the quantity of cargo it ordered. If containers are
loaded and sealed by the shipper, the consignee should be able to
rely on the shipper to place the agreed upon number of cartons in
the container. The consignee will rely on the carrier to ensure that
the container remains sealed and intact during the carriage. If the
seal is broken and the contents are pilfered, the carrier should be
liable unless the pilferage was due to a cause for which the carrier
has a defense. If the shipper does not place the agreed upon amount
of cargo in the container, the shipper, not the carrier, should bear
the liability. Judicial acceptance of this approach would enable the
parties to a contract of carriage to predict more accurately the
party bearing the risk and to place their insurance accordingly.
Similarly, holding that delivery occurs simultaneously with
physical transfer of cargo simplifies the law in this area, and allows
the parties to predict which party is at risk for loss or damage at the
discharge port. That party may then insure accordingly for such
risk.
